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WORK PRODUCT PRIVILEGE: THE FUTURE OF 
TAX ACCRUAL WORK PAPER DISCOVERY IN 
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT AFTER TEXTRON 
Tracy Hamilton* 
INTRODUCTION 
The struggle between the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and 
business taxpayers regarding the discovery of tax accrual work 
papers is not a new battle.1 The IRS, seeking a road map of the 
corporation’s vulnerable tax positions, argues that tax accrual work 
papers are prepared for ordinary business purposes and are not 
subject to the protection of the work product privilege as established 
in Hickman v. Taylor and codified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
26(b)(3).2 Corporate taxpayers, desperate to keep the IRS from 
discovering work papers containing the probability of success 
analysis of vulnerable tax positions (not to mention potential 
tolerance for settlement), argue that tax accrual work papers are 
prepared in anticipation of potential litigation with the IRS, contain 
                                                                                                                 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, 2011, Georgia State University College of Law. 
 1. Tax accrual work papers typically consist of a listing of vulnerable tax positions and the 
company’s assessment of likelihood of success on each position if the IRS challenges it. See discussion 
infra Part I.A. See generally United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984) (IRS challenge 
of a judgment holding that tax work papers are privileged); United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194 (2d 
Cir. 1998) (appeal of enforcement of IRS summons seeking taxpayer’s internal memo regarding tax 
consequences of proposed business transaction); United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 
1982) (appeal of enforcement of IRS summons seeking taxpayer’s tax accrual work papers); I.R.S. 
Announcement 2002-63 (July 8, 2002) (IRS expands internal policy on seeking tax accrual work 
papers). 
 2. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510–11 (1947) (“[I]t is essential that a lawyer work with a 
certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel. Proper 
preparation of a client’s case demands that he . . . prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy without 
undue and needless interference.”); United States v. Textron Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 150 (D.R.I. 
2007) (“The IRS asserts that the workpapers were prepared in the ordinary course of business and in 
order to satisfy the requirements of the securities laws that financial statements filed by publicly traded 
companies comply with GAAP . . . .”); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) (“[A] party may not discover documents 
and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial . . . .”). 
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mental impressions and strategy related to the potential litigation, and 
are subject to protection under the work product privilege doctrine.3  
The Supreme Court has not addressed whether tax accrual work 
papers, created both for financial reporting purposes and to aid in 
potential disputes with the IRS, fall under the protection of the work 
product privilege as material created “in anticipation of litigation.”4 
Circuit courts, faced with the question of whether tax accrual work 
papers were created in anticipation of litigation, have developed two 
distinct tests for analyzing the material: the “primary motivating 
purpose” test and the “because of” litigation test.5 A third test was 
added on August 13, 2009, when the First Circuit, in United States v. 
Textron Inc., overturned the district court’s application of the because 
of litigation test and established a new, narrow “for use” test.6 
The Eleventh Circuit has not addressed whether tax accrual work 
papers are protected by the work product privilege, nor has it 
formally adopted a test for determining whether material meets the in 
anticipation of litigation requirement for work product protection.7 
                                                                                                                 
 3. See Textron, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 150 (“Textron asserts that its tax accrual workpapers were 
prepared because it anticipated the possibility of litigation with the IRS regarding various items on its 
return and it points to the hazards of litigation percentages as evidence that the possibility of such 
litigation was the reason for preparing the workpapers.”). 
 4. See United States v. Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 2009) (“[T]he Supreme Court has not 
ruled on the issue before us, namely, one in which a document is not in any way prepared ‘for’ litigation 
but relates to a subject that might or might not occasion litigation.”); id. at 43 (Torruella, J., dissenting) 
(“The time is ripe for the Supreme Court to intervene and set the circuits straight on this issue which is 
essential to the daily practice of litigators across the country.”); Regions Fin. Corp. v. United States, No. 
2:06-CV-00895-RDP, 2008 WL 2139008, at *3 (N.D. Ala. May 8, 2008) (“The Supreme Court has not 
provided a controlling standard, and a split has developed between the various courts of appeal.”). 
 5. See El Paso, 682 F.2d at 542 (“Litigation need not be imminent . . . as long as the primary 
motivating purpose behind the creation of the document was to aid in possible future litigation.” 
(emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1040 (5th Cir. 1981))); Adlman, 134 
F.3d at 1195 (“We hold that a document created because of anticipated litigation, which tends to reveal 
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or theories concerning the litigation, does not lose work-
product protection merely because it is intended to assist in the making of a business decision . . . .” 
(emphasis added)). 
 6. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 29 (3-2 decision) (“From the outset, the focus of work product 
protection has been on materials prepared for use in litigation, whether the litigation was underway or 
merely anticipated.” (emphasis added)); id. at 32 (Torruella, J., dissenting) (“The majority purports to 
follow this [because of litigation] test, but never even cites it. Rather, in its place, the majority imposes a 
‘prepared for’ test, asking if the documents were ‘prepared for use in possible litigation.’”). 
 7. See discussion infra Part II.A; Regions, 2008 WL 2139008, at *5 (noting that the Eleventh 
Circuit had not adopted a test, and it was not necessary to decide which test should be adopted in this 
case because the material at issue would be protected under either the because of or primary motivating 
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Part I of this Note discusses the various tests adopted for 
determining whether material is prepared in anticipation of litigation, 
including the recent creation of a new test by the First Circuit Court’s 
decision in Textron.8 Part II analyzes the existing primary motivating 
purpose and because of tests, the history of the Eleventh Circuit’s 
decisions regarding material prepared in anticipation of litigation, and 
the potential impact on the Eleventh Circuit of the new for use test 
established by the First Circuit in Textron.9 Part III proposes that the 
Eleventh Circuit formally adopt the because of litigation test based on 
the merits of this test and the weaknesses of the primary motivating 
purpose and the new for use tests.10  
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The Purpose of Tax Accrual Work Papers 
The tax accrual work papers of interest to the IRS11—and litigated 
in the courts—typically consist of schedules and other material 
prepared by the corporation’s lawyers and tax department.12 The 
schedules list the tax positions reported on the corporation’s tax 
return that could be vulnerable to attack by the IRS.13  
Publicly traded corporations are required by law to have their 
financial statements audited by independent public accountants to 
ensure compliance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
                                                                                                                 
factor test); see also Michelle M. Henkel, Textron: The Debate Continues as to Whether Auditor 
Transparency Waives the Work Product Privilege, 50 TAX MGMT. MEMORANDUM 251, 253 n.22 (2009) 
(listing the circuits adopting one of the two main tests and noting that the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits 
have yet to adopt tests).  
 8. See discussion infra Part I. 
 9. See discussion infra Part II. 
 10. See discussion infra Part III. 
 11. The term “tax accrual work papers” is a general term used to indicate work papers that analyze 
potential tax liabilities that could arise due to a dispute with a taxing authority. These work papers are 
also known as “tax pool analysis work papers,” “FIN 48 work papers,” or “tax reserve work papers.” 
See, e.g., United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 1982) (“This appeal is centrally 
concerned with documents known to the accounting profession under various names—the noncurrent 
tax account, the tax accrual work papers, and the tax pool analysis.”). 
 12. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 812–13 (1984); United States v. 
Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 23 (1st Cir. 2009); El Paso, 682 F.2d at 532–34.  
 13. See Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 812–13; Textron, 577 F.3d at 23; El Paso, 682 F.2d at 532–34. 
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(GAAP).14 As part of this process, GAAP requires that the 
corporation have adequate liabilities recorded for uncertain tax 
benefits (tax reserves).15 The process requires that the corporation 
identify vulnerable tax positions and quantify the ultimate potential 
liability.16 First, the entity must determine if it is more likely than not 
that a specific tax position will be sustained on examination based on 
its technical merits.17 If the position is more likely than not to be 
sustained, the entity must measure the position at “the largest 
amount . . . greater than 50 percent likely of being realized upon 
ultimate settlement with a taxing authority.”18 The resulting tax 
reserve is recorded on the entity’s financial statements.19 In essence, 
these tax accrual work papers evaluate the likelihood of success in a 
dispute with the IRS and calculate the potential liability related to the 
specific tax position if disputed.20 The tax accrual work papers serve 
                                                                                                                 
 14. 15 U.S.C. § 78(l) (2006) (outlining registration application procedure with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission requiring balance sheets certified by a registered public accounting firm); 15 
U.S.C. § 78(m) (2006) (outlining annual reporting requirement of publically registered entities requiring 
quarterly and annual reports certified by a registered public accounting firm).  
 15. See ACCOUNTING FOR UNCERTAINTY IN INCOME TAXES, Interpretation No. 48, ¶ 17 (Fin. 
Accounting Standards Bd. 2006) (codified at FASB CODIFICATION § 740-10-25-16 (Fin. Accounting 
Standards Bd. 2009) (on file with author) [hereinafter FASB Interpretation No. 48] (requiring 
establishment of liability for uncertain tax positions). The Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) is the organization that establishes and issues standards governing financial reporting by 
nongovernmental entities. Facts about FASB, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, 
http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/SectionPage&cid=1176154526495. The FASB issues literature that 
makes up part of the body of financial accounting guidance known as Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP). See Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, FEDERAL ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS ADVISORY BOARD, http://www.fasab.gov/accepted.html. This literature includes 
Statements of Financial Accounting Standards (FAS) and Interpretations (FIN). See id. On July 1, 2009, 
the FASB released its Accounting Standards Codification (FASB Codification), which was the 
culmination of an effort by the FASB to combine and organize the existing GAAP literature. See 
Accounting Standards Codification: Notice to Constituents (v 4.1) About the Codification (Apr. 30, 
2010), http://asc.fasb.org/imageRoot/18/6896518.pdf. 
 16. See FASB Interpretation No. 48, supra note 15, at ¶¶ 5–8 (discussing recognition and 
measurement steps). 
 17. See id. at ¶ 6 (outlining first step of whether or not to recognize a tax benefit created by a 
particular tax position). 
 18. See id. at ¶ 8 (outlining second step of calculating the amount to reserve related to the recognized 
tax position). 
 19. The tax reserve amount that is established on the company’s financial statements is the 
difference between the full benefit of the tax position and the most likely settlement scenario. See id. at 
¶ 17. 
 20. Id.; United States v. Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 23 (1st Cir. 2009) (“The final spreadsheets list 
each debatable item, including in each instance the dollar amount subject to possible dispute and a 
percentage estimate of the IRS’ chances of success.”). 
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a dual-purpose—they are prepared to comply with current financial 
reporting requirements, and they aid in business decisions regarding 
whether to litigate a particular issue or possible settlement 
scenarios.21 Courts have not agreed on whether dual-purpose material 
properly fits under the definition of prepared in anticipation of 
litigation.22 The result has been the development of various tests to 
analyze material under the in anticipation of litigation requirement of 
Rule 26(b)(3).23  
B.  Work Product Privilege and the in Anticipation of Litigation 
Requirement 
Hickman v. Taylor is the leading case for the principle of the work 
product privilege.24 In Hickman, the Supreme Court held that certain 
documents and other tangible things prepared during litigation, when 
not protected by another privilege (such as the attorney-client 
privilege), are nonetheless protected from discovery by opponents 
because they contain the attorney’s thoughts, ideas, and strategy.25 
This principle was codified by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
26(b)(3), which sets forth the requirement for protection as “prepared 
                                                                                                                 
 21. See 15 U.S.C. § 781(l) (2006) (requiring financial statements be certified by a registered public 
accounting firm); 15 U.S.C. § 78(m) (2006) (requiring annual reports certified by independent public 
accountants). For discussion by courts of dual-purpose documents, see, for example, United States v. 
Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1200 (2d Cir. 1998); Textron, 577 F.3d at 33 (Torruella, J., dissenting).  
 22. See Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1195 (holding that material created because of anticipated litigation 
does not lose work product protection simply because it has a dual business purpose). But see Textron, 
577 F.3d at 26 (utilizing new for use in litigation test and holding dual-purpose documents not protected 
because not prepared for use in possible litigation); United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 542 (5th 
Cir. 1982) (utilizing primary motivating purpose test and holding dual-purpose documents not 
protected).  
 23. See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 24. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); see, e.g., Textron, 577 F.3d at 25 (noting that the work 
product privilege is derived from Hickman v. Taylor); United States v. Roxworthy, 457 F.3d 590, 593 
(6th Cir. 2006) (“The ‘work product privilege’ was first recognized by the Supreme Court in Hickman v. 
Taylor . . . .”); EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN & MICHAEL M. MARTIN, AM BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF LITIG., THE 
ATTORNEY–CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK–PRODUCT DOCTRINE 100 (1989) (1982) (“Discussion 
of the work-product doctrine must begin with the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Hickman v. 
Taylor . . . .”).  
 25. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510–11. 
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in anticipation of litigation or for trial.”26 Clearly, work product 
containing the attorney’s thoughts and strategy that are prepared for 
trial are protected,27 but how far should the work product protection 
extend? Should material that contains the attorney’s thoughts, ideas, 
and strategies but that is not prepared for trial be discoverable?28  
The Supreme Court has not established a test for determining 
whether material is prepared in anticipation of litigation.29 Circuit 
courts have struggled to apply the prepared in anticipation of 
litigation requirement, and various tests have evolved for analyzing 
material that is not prepared for trial but nonetheless may be 
protected work product.30 The Second Circuit has adopted a because 
of litigation test, holding that work product privilege protection 
extends to tax accrual work papers which would not be prepared “but 
for” the potential for litigation, despite the dual-purpose of the work 
papers.31 The Fifth Circuit adopted a more narrow primary 
motivating purpose test, holding that tax accrual work papers are not 
protected by the work product privilege because the immediate and 
primary purpose of the work papers is to comply with relevant 
accounting standards, resulting in a clean audit opinion of the 
company’s financial statements, despite the use of the work papers in 
potential litigation.32 The First Circuit, in its recent decision in United 
States v. Textron, Inc., seemed to ignore the adopted because of 
litigation test and created a new for use in litigation test, significantly 
                                                                                                                 
 26. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) (“Ordinarily, a party may not discover documents and tangible things 
that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its 
representative . . . .”). 
 27. Id. 
 28. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 26 (“[T]he Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue before us, namely, 
one in which a document is not in any way prepared ‘for’ litigation but relates to a subject that might or 
might not occasion litigation.”). 
 29. See id.; id. at 43 (Torruella, J., dissenting); Regions Fin. Corp. v. United States, No. 2:06-CV-
00895-RDP, 2008 WL 2139008, at *3 (N.D. Ala. May 8, 2008). 
 30. See United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 542 (5th Cir. 1982) (primary motivating purpose 
test); United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1195 (2d Cir. 1998) (because of litigation test); Textron, 
577 F.3d at 26 (new for use in litigation test). 
 31. Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1195. 
 32. See El Paso, 682 F.2d at 542. 
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narrowing the scope of protection historically provided to tax accrual 
work papers in the First Circuit.33 
1.  Because of Litigation Test 
The Second Circuit first applied the because of litigation test in 
United States v. Adlman.34 The court vacated and remanded the 
district court’s decision enforcing an IRS summons, the subject of 
which was a memorandum evaluating the tax consequences of 
possible litigation with the IRS around a proposed corporate 
reorganization.35 The court of appeals held that material “created 
because of anticipated litigation” that contains the “mental 
impressions, conclusions, opinions or theories” of the attorney does 
not lose protection just because the material has a dual-purpose.36 
The court further stated that “[w]here a document was created 
because of anticipated litigation, and would not have been prepared 
in substantially similar form but for the prospect of that litigation, it 
falls within Rule 26(b)(3).”37 This standard allows material, which is 
created in anticipation of litigation but happens to have a dual-
purpose of assisting in business decisions, protection as work 
product.38 The because of litigation test has been widely adopted and 
is the most prevalent test utilized by circuit courts to analyze material 
under the in anticipation of litigation requirement for work product 
privilege.39 This test views the underlying premise of the work 
                                                                                                                 
 33. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 32 (Torruella, J., dissenting) (noting that while the majority purports to 
follow the because of test, it instead applies a new for use test that “is an even narrower variant of the 
widely rejected ‘primary motivating purpose’ test . . . specifically repudiated by this court”).  
 34. Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1195. 
 35. Id. at 1197. This was a case of first impression for the Second Circuit. The court performed a 
thorough analysis of the possible tests it could use to determine whether a litigation analysis prepared to 
assist the company in making a business decision could be protected by the work product doctrine. Id. 
 36. Id. at 1195.  
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. (holding that dual-purpose document containing legal analysis of outcome of potential 
litigation was not denied protection simply because it aided in business decision of whether to pursue the 
transaction). 
 39. Regions Fin. Corp. v. United States, No. 2:06-CV-00895-RDP, 2008 WL 2139008, at *5 (N.D. 
Ala. May 8, 2008) (“[T]he court concludes that the Eleventh Circuit would align itself with the majority 
of the other courts of appeal and adopt the ‘because of litigation’ test.”). For other courts adopting the 
because of test, see Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Murray Sheet Metal Co., 967 F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir. 
1992); Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co., 816 F.2d 397, 401 (8th Cir. 1987); Senate of P.R. v. U.S. Dep’t of 
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product privilege as that of protecting the attorney’s mental 
impressions and strategy and accepts as a possibility that some 
material created in the ordinary course of business will be 
protected.40 
2.  Primary Motivating Purpose Test 
The Fifth Circuit articulated the primary motivating purpose test in 
United States v. El Paso, Co.41 Here, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s enforcement of an IRS summons for certain tax 
accrual work papers and held that the work product privilege 
extended to material prepared in anticipation of litigation only when 
“the primary motivating purpose behind the creation of the document 
was to aid in possible future litigation.”42 The court interpreted the 
advisory committee notes to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) 
to exclude any material that is assembled in the ordinary course of 
business even if that material may have been prepared because of 
potential litigation.43 Therefore, under this test, any material that is 
prepared in the ordinary course of business or because of public 
requirements, despite containing the mental impressions or theories 
of attorneys, can be denied work product protection.44 This test is 
                                                                                                                 
Justice, 823 F.2d 574, 587 n.42 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Binks Mfg. Co. v. Nat’l Presto Indus., Inc., 709 F.2d 
1109, 1118–19 (7th Cir. 1983); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 803 (3d Cir. 1979). 
 40. Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1195 (noting that a business document does not necessarily “lose work-
product protection merely because it is intended to assist in the making of a business decision influenced 
by the likely outcome of the anticipated litigation”). 
 41. See United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 542 (5th Cir. 1982) (“Litigation need not be 
imminent . . . as long as the primary motivating purpose behind the creation of the document was to aid 
in possible future litigation.” (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1040 
(5th Cir. 1981))). 
 42. Id. at 542 (quoting United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1040 (5th Cir. 1981)). 
 43. Id. (“Excluded from work product materials, as the advisory committee notes to Rule 26(b)(3) 
make clear, are ‘materials assembled in the ordinary course of business, or pursuant to public 
requirements unrelated to litigation . . . .’”). However, the advisory committee’s notes go on to explain 
this statement as reiterating the holding in Hickman v. Taylor that relevant facts are always discoverable, 
even if those facts are in a document not otherwise discoverable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) advisory 
committee’s note (1970), reprinted in Judicial Conference of the United States, Proposed Amendments 
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery, 48 F.R.D. 487, 501 (70) [hereinafter 
1970 Amendments]. 
 44. El Paso, 682 F.2d at 542–43 (“Even assuming that El Paso’s tax pool analysis otherwise 
qualifies for work product protection, we hold the doctrine unavailable here because the tax pool 
analysis is not prepared ‘in anticipation of litigation.’”). 
8
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 7
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol27/iss3/7
2011] WORK PRODUCT PRIVILEGE  
 
737
more narrow than the because of litigation test because the primary 
motivating purpose test will deny protection to work papers 
containing the mental impressions of attorneys with respect to 
possible litigation simply because there is a business use.45 The 
primary motivating purpose test has been rejected by many courts,46 
criticized as being too narrow and inconsistent with the purpose of 
the work product privilege, which is to protect the mental 
impressions and strategies of attorneys in preparing for potential 
litigation.47  
3.  The For Use in Litigation Test 
In 2008, the United States District Court for the District of Rhode 
Island, applying the because of litigation test adopted by the First 
Circuit in Maine v. U.S. Department of the Interior,48 rejected an IRS 
summons seeking tax accrual work papers.49 Despite the taxpayer’s 
need to create these work papers to obtain a clean audit opinion, the 
court held that because these work papers were prepared because of 
                                                                                                                 
 45. Id. 
 46. See United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1199 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Framing the inquiry as 
whether the primary or exclusive purpose of the document was to assist in litigation threatens to deny 
protection to documents that implicate key concerns underlying the work-product doctrine.”); Maine v. 
U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 298 F.3d 60, 68 (1st Cir. 2002) (adopting the because of test and noting the 
rejection of the primary motivating purpose test by the Adlman court); Evergreen Trading, LLC ex rel. 
Nussdorf v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 122, 132–33 (2007) (holding that the because of test is preferable 
to the primary motivating purpose test because “such an approach could unreasonably deny the 
protection to ‘dual-purpose’ documents generated in making the decision whether to enter into a 
transaction based upon tax litigation concerns, even though such documents could reveal an attorney’s 
litigating strategies and assessment of legal vulnerabilities—precisely the type of discovery that the 
Supreme Court refused to permit in Hickman”). 
 47. Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1198 (“[A] requirement that documents be produced primarily . . . to assist 
in litigation . . . is at odds with the text and the policies of the Rule. Nowhere does Rule 26(b)(3) state 
that a document must have been prepared to aid in the conduct of litigation in order to constitute work 
product . . . .”); see also Maine, 298 F.3d at 68; Evergreen Trading, 80 Fed. Cl. at 133. 
 48. The because of litigation test was adopted by the First Circuit in Maine v. U.S. Dep’t of the 
Interior. 298 F.3d at 68. The First Circuit reversed the district court’s enforcement of a summons related 
to work papers and explicitly rejected the Fifth Circuit’s primary motivating purpose test, formally 
adopting the because of litigation test and citing the Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. 
Adlman. Id.  
 49. United States v. Textron, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 141 (D.R.I. 2007). 
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anticipated litigation, they were protected work product.50 A panel of 
the First Circuit upheld the district court’s decision.51 
The First Circuit granted the government’s petition for rehearing 
en banc and, on August 13, 2009, in its decision in United States v. 
Textron, Inc., vacated and remanded the district court’s finding, 
holding that Textron’s work papers were not protected by the work 
product privilege.52 The circuit court abandoned the because of test 
adopted in Maine and instead created a completely new test for 
analyzing the in anticipation of litigation requirement of Rule 
26(b)(3).53 The new (and very narrow)54 test—the for use in litigation 
test—requires that material be prepared for use in possible litigation, 
allowing discovery of documents where there was no implication that 
they would actually be used at trial.55 The Textron court’s view that 
the work product privilege is aimed at protecting work done for 
litigation and not for preparing financial statements is evidenced by 
the court’s statement: “‘[P]repared in anticipation of litigation or for 
trial’ did not . . . mean prepared for some purpose other than 
litigation: it meant only that the work might be done for litigation but 
in advance of its institution.”56  
C.  The Eleventh Circuit 
The Eleventh Circuit has not addressed whether tax accrual work 
papers may be protected by the work product privilege, nor has it 
formally adopted a test for determining whether material meets the in 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Id. at 150 (“Moreover, even if the workpapers were needed to satisfy E & Y that Textron’s 
reserves complied with GAAP, that would not alter the fact that the workpapers were prepared ‘because 
of’ anticipated litigation with the IRS.”). 
 51. United States v. Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 32 (Torruella, J., dissenting) (“The majority purports to follow this [because of litigation] 
test, but never even cites it. Rather, in its place, the majority imposes a ‘prepared for’ test, asking if the 
documents were ‘prepared for use in possible litigation.’”). 
 54. Id. (Torruella, J., dissenting) (noting that this newly created for use test is even narrower than the 
primary motivating purpose test which was previously rejected by the First Circuit). 
 55. Id. at 30 (“There is no evidence in this case that the work papers . . . would in fact serve any 
useful purpose for Textron in conducting litigation . . . .”). 
 56. Id. at 29. The court continued, “[T]he work product privilege is aimed at protecting work done 
for litigation, not in preparing financial statements.” Id. at 31. 
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anticipation of litigation requirement for work product protection.57 
In Regions Financial Corporation v. United States, the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama stated that if it 
had to determine which test the Eleventh Circuit would adopt, it 
would select the because of litigation test.58 The district court’s ruling 
in Regions rested heavily on the District of Rhode Island’s decision 
in Textron, the same reasoning rejected by the First Circuit in its 
review of the lower court’s Textron decision.59  
The Supreme Court has not imposed a test for determining whether 
material is created in anticipation of litigation, though the dissent in 
Textron noted: “The time is ripe for the Supreme Court to intervene 
and set the circuits straight on this issue which is essential to the daily 
practice of litigators across the country.”60 Until the Supreme Court 
addresses this issue, circuit courts are left to determine the 
appropriate method for analyzing potentially protected material. A 
thorough analysis of the case history of the Eleventh Circuit is the 
first step in determining the appropriate test the courts in the Eleventh 
Circuit should apply. Additionally, analysis of the text and 
underlying policy of Rule 26(b)(3), along with analysis of the three 
existing tests, should guide the Eleventh Circuit in its determination 
of the proper method to evaluate material for potential work product 
protection. 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Regions Fin. Corp. v. United States, No. 2:06-CV-00895-RDP, 2008 WL 2139008, *5 (N.D. 
Ala. May 8, 2008) (“[T]he parties have called upon the court to decide how the Eleventh Circuit would 
resolve this issue. If it were forced to decide the question, the court concludes that the Eleventh Circuit 
would align itself with the majority of the other courts of appeal and adopt the ‘because of litigation’ 
test. However, it is not necessary to determine which test applies here because the result in this case is 
the same regardless of which test the court applies.”).  
 58. Id. The Regions court first determined that the Eleventh Circuit had not explicitly adopted a test 
for determining whether material was prepared in anticipation of litigation before going on to conclude 
which test it thought the Eleventh Circuit would adopt. 
 59. Id. at *6 (relying heavily on the district court’s “but for” analysis, stating that “there would have 
been no need to create a reserve in the first place, if Textron had not anticipated a dispute with the IRS 
that was likely to result in litigation or some other adversarial proceeding” (quoting United States v. 
Textron, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 150 (D.R.I. 2007))); Textron, 577 F.3d at 26 (holding that the work 
papers at issue were not prepared in anticipation of litigation).  
 60. Textron, 577 F.3d at 43 (Torruella, J., dissenting). 
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II.  CIRCUIT SPLIT ANALYSIS 
A.  The Eleventh Circuit Has Not Adopted a Test for Analyzing in 
Anticipation of Litigation 
The first step in determining the test the Eleventh Circuit should 
apply to the question of whether material was prepared in anticipation 
of litigation, for purposes of Rule 26(b)(3), is an analysis of the 
previous Fifth and Eleventh Circuit Court decisions.61 The Eleventh 
Circuit is bound by the decisions of the Fifth Circuit handed down 
before October 1, 1981.62 This specific question—whether the Fifth 
Circuit had formally adopted a test for analyzing work product under 
the in anticipation of litigation requirement prior to the creation of the 
Eleventh Circuit—was addressed directly by the District Court of 
Northern Alabama in Regions Financial v. United States.63 The court 
performed a thorough analysis of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuit 
decisions and concluded that no binding test had been previously 
adopted.64 Further, the court did not apply one of the two existing 
tests—the because of or primary motivating purpose tests—in 
                                                                                                                 
 61. This Note addresses what test the Eleventh Circuit should adopt, so if a review of the previous 
decisions of the Eleventh Circuit shows that a test has previously been adopted, the analysis ends. 
Additionally, if a test had been adopted by the Fifth Circuit prior to the creation of the Eleventh Circuit, 
it would be binding unless the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, overturns the previous decision. See 
infra note 62. 
 62. Regions, 2008 WL 2139008, at *4 n.6 (citing Bonner and noting that a review of Fifth Circuit 
decisions was required to determine if a binding test had been adopted); Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 
F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (holding that all Fifth Circuit decisions handed down before 
the close of business on September 30, 1981, are binding on the Eleventh Circuit). This does not mean 
that if a test were adopted by the Fifth Circuit it could not be overturned, but it would require the 
Eleventh Circuit en banc court to overturn prior precedent of the Fifth Circuit handed down before the 
creation of the Eleventh Circuit. Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc. 204 F.3d 1069, 1076 (11th Cir. 2000).  
 63. Regions, 2008 WL 2139008, at *3–5. Although the court’s discussion is dictum because the 
court determined it did not need to apply a test in this case, the court performed a thorough analysis of 
three previous Eleventh and Fifth Circuit decisions and concluded that no binding test had been adopted. 
Id. 
 64. Id. Here, the court analyzed three previous decisions: In re Newton, 718 F.2d 1015, 1016 (11th 
Cir. 1983), Hoover v. U.S. Dep’t. of the Interior, 611 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1980), and United States v. 
Davis, 636 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1981). The court held that Newton was not binding because it did not 
address the attorney work product privilege; rather, Newton dealt with an accountant work product 
privilege, similar to that addressed in United States v. Arthur Young, 465 U.S. 805, 817 (1984). Regions, 
2008 WL 2139008, at *3–5. The court held that Hoover was not binding because the court did not 
articulate a test. Id. at *4. Finally, the court held that Davis was not binding because the Davis court’s 
discussion of a possible test was dictum. Id. at *5; see also discussion infra Part.II.B.2. 
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Regions because it determined that under the facts of the case the 
material in question would be protected under either currently 
existing test.65 No cases addressing this issue have been presented in 
the Eleventh Circuit since Regions, so the Eleventh Circuit is free to 
formally adopt the most appropriate test for analyzing material under 
the in anticipation of litigation requirement of Rule 26(b)(3).66 
B.  Possible Tests the Eleventh Circuit Could Adopt 
1.  The Because of Litigation Test 
The primary goal of the because of litigation test is protection of 
material that contains the mental impressions, conclusions, and 
opinions of the attorney, and it allows protection of material that may 
have a business purpose but nonetheless was created because of 
anticipated litigation.67 The because of litigation test does not conflict 
with the plain language of Rule 26(b)(3), which protects documents 
prepared in anticipation of litigation.68 Further, the because of 
litigation test does not conflict with the underlying policy of the work 
product doctrine, which is to protect the attorney’s assessment of the 
issue in light of potential litigation.69  
Rule 26(b)(3) reads: “Ordinarily, a party may not discover . . . 
things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial.”70 The 
                                                                                                                 
 65. Regions, 2008 WL 2139008, at *5–6. The court found that the work papers at issue were created 
because of litigation—there would have been no need for a tax reserve if Regions did not anticipate 
litigation with the IRS. Id. Further, the court found that Regions was primarily motivated by litigation 
because the company was soliciting legal opinions on the outcome of litigation, which meets the primary 
motivating purpose test. Id. 
 66. Regions Financial was decided on May 8, 2008, and a Westlaw search revealed that no further 
decisions requiring the Eleventh Circuit to answer the question of whether dual-purpose material was 
prepared in anticipation of litigation have been reported. 
 67. United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1195 (2d Cir. 1998). This test stems from the Wright & 
Miller treatise which articulates the appropriate test as “whether, in light of the nature of the document 
and the factual situation in the particular case, the document can fairly be said to have been prepared or 
obtained because of the prospect of litigation.” 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2024 (2009). The treatise emphasizes that “‘[d]ual purpose’ 
documents created because of the prospect of litigation are protected even though they were also 
prepared for a business purpose.” Id. 
 68. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3); see infra note 148. 
 69. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 70. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). 
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text of the Rule states that material other than only that prepared “for 
trial” is protected.71 Specifically, material prepared in anticipation of 
litigation is also protected.72 The because of litigation test applies this 
language literally, providing protection to documents created because 
of anticipated litigation and not limiting protection to documents 
created only for litigation.73 Additionally, the because of litigation 
test protects the mental impression and opinions of the attorney, 
complying with the underlying policy of work product protection as 
stated by the Supreme Court.74 Finally, the because of litigation test 
allows protection of dual-purpose documents, which is not at odds 
with the intent of the drafters of the Rule.75 
Because this test is firmly grounded in both the plain language and 
underlying policy of the work product doctrine, it has been embraced 
by many courts, making it the most widely adopted test applied in 
analyzing material under the in anticipation of litigation requirement 
for work product protection.76 
2.  The Primary Motivating Purpose Test 
The primary motivating purpose test has been expressly adopted 
by only one circuit.77 This test protects material only when the 
primary purpose of the material is to assist in litigation.78 In United 
States v. El Paso, the court applied the test articulated in United 
States v. Davis and held that the dual-purpose work papers at issue 
were not protected because the primary purpose of the work papers 
                                                                                                                 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1195 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Where a document was 
created because of anticipated litigation . . . it falls within Rule 26(b)(3).”). 
 74. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 236 (1975) (reiterating the strong public policy 
considerations outlined in Hickman v. Taylor.); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510–11 (1947). 
 75. See discussion infra Part III.C.1. 
 76. See cases cited supra note 39. 
 77. United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 542 (5th Cir. 1982); see also Henkel, supra note 7, at 
253 n.22 (noting that only the Fifth Circuit applies the primary motivating purpose test). 
 78. El Paso, 682 F.2d at 542–43. This test was based on an earlier decision of the Fifth Circuit in 
United States v. Davis. 636 F.2d 1028. The Davis court stated: “We conclude that litigation need not 
necessarily be imminent . . . as long as the primary motivating purpose behind the creation of the 
document was to aid in possible future litigation.” Id. at 1040 (emphasis added). 
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was to obtain a clean audit opinion.79 However, in relying on Davis, 
the El Paso court overlooks a key difference in the facts of the two 
cases.80 Davis dealt with tax return work papers,81 but El Paso dealt 
with tax accrual work papers.82  
Tax return work papers are prepared simply to support amounts 
reported on the tax return.83 They are prepared in the ordinary course 
of business and are prepared regardless of whether there is a 
possibility of litigation.84 They do not support tax reserves, and they 
do not contain material that has historically been protected as the 
opinion or mental impressions of attorneys—they are accounting 
records that support the numbers on the tax return.85 Thus, the court 
in Davis correctly found that these tax return work papers were not 
prepared in anticipation of litigation because the only purpose for 
preparing them was a business purpose—to support a business tax 
filing required by law.86 There was no need for the Davis court to 
apply a test because there was no question that these work papers 
were not prepared “in anticipation of [any] litigation.”87 
Tax accrual work papers are not prepared to support tax return 
filings; they are prepared to calculate (and properly reserve) the 
possible outcome of litigation with the IRS.88 It is this possibility of 
                                                                                                                 
 79. El Paso, 682 F.2d at 543–44. 
 80. Compare Davis, 636 F.2d at 1032 (addressing tax return work papers), with El Paso, 682 F.2d at 
533 (addressing tax accrual work papers). 
 81. Davis, 636 F.2d at 1032 (The material at issue consisted of “workpapers . . . generated in the 
course of preparing . . . tax returns.”). 
 82. El Paso, 682 F.2d at 533 (Here, the court was “concerned with documents known to the 
accounting profession [as] tax accrual work papers.”). 
 83. Davis, 636 F.2d at 1032. 
 84. United States v. Textron Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 146 (D.R.I. 2007) (“[T]he mere preparation 
of a tax return is viewed as accounting work and a taxpayer may not cloak the documents generated in 
that process with a privilege simply ‘by hiring a lawyer to do the work that an accountant . . . normally 
would do.’” (quoting United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496, 500 (7th Cir. 1999))). 
 85. See Davis, 636 F.2d at 1032. 
 86. Id. at 1039–40 (“[I]t is plain here that none of the summoned documents were ‘materials 
prepared by an attorney “acting for his client in anticipation of litigation.”’” (quoting United States v. 
Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 237–38 (1975))). 
 87. Prior to the conclusion of the Davis court that a primary motivating purpose should be the test, 
the court clearly stated that it was “plain” in this case that the documents were not prepared in 
anticipation of litigation—making it unnecessary (and thus dictum) to articulate a test to determine 
whether the material was created in anticipation of litigation. Davis, 636 F.2d at 1039–40. 
 88. FASB Interpretation No. 48, supra note 15, at ¶¶ 5–8 (outlining two step process for identifying 
and measuring uncertain tax positions). 
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litigation aspect of the tax accrual work paper that requires the 
application of a test to determine if the material is protected work 
product.89 The Fifth Circuit, in El Paso, was free to create a test 
requiring a primary motivating purpose requirement, but it did not 
perform any analysis of the merits of the appropriate test; instead, it 
relied on the Davis language as precedent.90 Because Davis dealt with 
tax return work papers, the court did not need to apply a test to 
determine if the material at issue was prepared in anticipation of 
litigation, and the court in El Paso should have treated the language 
in Davis as dictum.91 The court in Regions Financial recognized this 
fact in determining that the language in Davis did not create binding 
precedent for the Eleventh Circuit.92 
As applied by the Fifth Circuit, the primary motivating purpose 
test ignores the actual language of Rule 26(b)(3) and fails to consider 
the underlying policy behind the protection of work product.93 
Because of this, several courts have criticized the Fifth Circuit’s 
primary motivating purpose test as inconsistent with the language and 
goals of the work product privilege.94  
                                                                                                                 
 89. Regions Fin. Corp. v. United States, No. 2:06-CV-00895-RDP, 2008 WL 2139008, *4 (N.D. 
Ala. May 8, 2008) (noting the difference between ordinary tax return work papers and work papers that 
analyze tax positions). 
 90. United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 542 (5th Cir. 1982) (“In United States v. Davis we 
phrased the test in the following terms: ‘Litigation need not be imminent . . . as long as the primary 
motivating purpose . . . was to aid in possible future litigation.’” (quoting United States v. Davis, 636 
F.2d 1028, 1040 (5th Cir. 1981))). 
 91. United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1998) (The court discusses Davis and 
finds that because there was no evidence of anticipated litigation in Davis, the court’s language could be 
characterized as dictum.). 
 92. See discussion supra Part II.A discussing the impact of Fifth Circuit decisions on the Eleventh 
Circuit. Regions, 2008 WL 2139008, at *4 (“[T]he Second Circuit has opined that because ‘there was no 
showing whatsoever of anticipation of litigation,’ the Davis language ‘might be characterized as 
dictum’. . . . Even without viewing Davis language as dicta, the factual differences between Davis and 
the present case make Davis wholly distinguishable.”). 
 93. See infra note 94. 
 94. Maine v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 298 F.3d 60, 68 (1st Cir. 2002) (adopting the because of test 
and noting the rejection of the primary motivating purpose test by the Adlman court); Adlman, 134 F.3d 
at 1198 (holding that a requirement of primary purpose is at odds with the Rule); Evergreen Trading, 
LLC ex rel. Nussdorf v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 122, 132 (2007) (holding that the because of test is 
preferable to the primary motivating purpose test). In Evergreen Trading, the court rationalized that the 
primary motivating purpose test “could unreasonably deny the protection to ‘dual-purpose’ documents 
generated in making the decision whether to enter into a transaction based upon tax litigation concerns, 
even though such documents could reveal an attorney’s litigating strategies and assessment of legal 
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The Second Circuit, in United States v. Adlman, stated that a 
requirement of primary purpose is at odds with the language of Rule 
26(b)(3), which on its face allows protection of documents prepared 
both for trial and in anticipation of litigation.95 The court noted that 
nowhere in Rule 26(b)(3) is there a requirement that a document be 
created primarily to aid in litigation, and if the drafters had intended 
such a requirement, they would have simply used “prepared . . . for 
trial” and not added language that documents prepared in anticipation 
of litigation were protected work product.96 The U.S. Court of 
Federal Claims, in Evergreen Trading v. United States, likewise held 
that the primary motivating purpose test did not comport to the plain 
language of the Rule.97  
Applying the primary motivating purpose test in the way the Fifth 
Circuit has applied it ignores the underlying policy of work product 
protection. The Second Circuit stated it very well in Adlman:  
Where the Rule has explicitly established a special level of 
protection against disclosure for documents revealing an 
attorney’s . . . opinion and legal theories concerning litigation, it 
would oddly undermine its purposes if such documents were 
excluded from protection merely because they were prepared to 
assist in the making of a business decision expected to result in 
the litigation.98  
The Supreme Court has held that there is a strong public policy 
underlying the work product privilege, emphasizing the importance 
                                                                                                                 
vulnerabilities—precisely the type of discovery that the Supreme Court refused to permit in Hickman.” 
Id. 
 95. Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1198 (“We believe that a requirement that documents be produced primarily 
or exclusively to assist in litigation in order to be protected is at odds with the text and the policies of the 
Rule. . . . Preparing a document ‘in anticipation of litigation’ is sufficient.”). 
 96. Id. (“If the drafters . . . intended to limit its protection to documents made to assist in preparation 
for litigation, this would have been adequately conveyed by the phrase ‘prepared . . . for trial.’”). 
 97. See Evergreen Trading, 80 Fed. Cl. at 132–33. In determining which test was appropriate to 
apply, the court analyzed both the because of and the primary motivating purpose tests. Id. The court 
stated that the because of test “more closely tracks the language of the rule, which says nothing of 
whether a document is produced ‘primarily’ for litigation, but rather is triggered so long as anticipating 
litigation was one of the purposes for which the document was prepared.” Id. 
 98. Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1199. 
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of protecting documents that tend to reveal the attorney’s “mental 
[process].”99 In Adlman, the court illustrated the problems that would 
arise by applying the primary motivating purpose test.100 For 
example, a memorandum prepared in expectation of litigation that 
analyzed the legal outcomes of a proposed business transaction 
would be discoverable simply because the memorandum’s primary 
purpose was to assist the company in deciding whether to undertake 
the transaction.101 The result is discovery of critical opinions and 
impressions of the attorney preparing the memorandum in 
anticipation of litigation—the very essence of what the work product 
privilege is designed to protect.102 
However, even if the primary motivating purpose test is adopted, 
when this test is applied correctly, tax accrual work papers analyzing 
the various outcomes of possible litigation with the IRS are protected. 
In Regions Financial v. United States, the court held that the tax 
accrual work papers at issue would be protected under either of the 
two tests available: the because of or the primary motivating purpose 
test.103 The court went on to say that although there was a business 
purpose, the work papers “would not have been created were Regions 
not primarily concerned with litigating with the IRS concerning the 
Transaction.”104 The Regions court was careful to isolate and identify 
the motivation behind the creation of the work papers, and the court 
did not confuse the purpose of the work papers with their resulting 
benefit.105 The purpose of the entire process of creating tax accrual 
work papers is to set aside sufficient funds in the event liability arises 
                                                                                                                 
 99. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 236 (1975) (reiterating the strong public policy 
considerations outlined in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947)). 
 100. Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1199–1200 (giving several examples of the problems that result from 
applying the primary motivating purpose test). 
 101. Id. at 1199. 
 102. Id. (“Framing the inquiry as whether the primary . . . purpose . . . was to assist in litigation 
threatens to deny protection to documents that implicate key concerns underlying the work-product 
doctrine.”). 
 103. Regions Fin. Corp. v. United States, No. 2:06-CV-00895-RDP, 2008 WL 2139008, *7 (N.D. 
Ala. May 8, 2008) (“[T]he court finds that Regions has . . . show[n] that the contested documents were 
created in anticipation of litigation regardless of whether this court applies the ‘because of litigation’ or 
‘primary motivating purpose’ test.”). 
 104. Regions, 2008 WL 2139008, at *7. 
 105. See id. at *6. 
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from its tax positions.106 The company is attempting to forecast (and 
reserve) the most likely impact of potential litigation with the IRS.107 
The benefit derived from that purpose is that the company is not 
misleading its investors (i.e., the company is properly reserved and 
can obtain a clean audit opinion of its financial statements).108 If the 
formulation of the test as articulated by the Regions court was applied 
in El Paso, the work papers would have been protected. In El Paso, 
the court found that the primary purpose of the tax accrual work 
papers at issue was to adequately reserve the impact of possible 
litigation with the IRS.109 The El Paso court seems to confuse the 
resulting benefit of the work papers with the purpose for creating the 
work papers.110 The immediate purpose was to adequately reserve the 
impact of litigation on the company’s financial statements, but the 
primary purpose was to calculate the potential scenarios of litigation 
with the IRS—El Paso would not have prepared the work papers had 
they not anticipated a dispute with the IRS.  
3.  The For Use Test 
The for use test, recently created by the First Circuit in Textron v. 
United States, protects material only if prepared for use in 
litigation.111 This court’s view is that the work product privilege is 
aimed at protecting work done for litigation and not for preparing 
financial statements.112 The court stated: “‘[P]repared in anticipation 
                                                                                                                 
 106. WEST’S TAX LAW DICTIONARY 1052 (2009) (defining tax accrual work papers as “[w]ork papers 
and related documents prepared by accountants in evaluating a taxpayer’s contingent liability” 
(emphasis added)). The purpose of tax reserves is to anticipate and establish a liability on the financial 
statements before disagreement with the IRS. See FASB Interpretation No. 48, supra note 15, at ¶ 17. 
The tax positions reserved are called uncertain tax positions precisely because the company does not yet 
know if they will win or lose on the tax position until the IRS audits the tax return. See Id. at ¶¶ 6, 17. 
 107. See FASB Interpretation No. 48, supra note 15, at ¶ 17. 
 108. See id. The purpose of FASB Interpretation No. 48 is to identify and measure uncertain tax 
positions that are anticipated to be contested by the IRS. See id. at ¶¶ 6–8. By identifying and measuring 
its tax uncertainties, the company will properly reserve the potential liability on its financial statements, 
and the readers of the financial statements will not be misled. See id. at ¶ 17.  
 109. United States v. El Paso, 682 F.2d 530, 543 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 110. See supra note 108. 
 111. United States v. Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 112. Id. (“[T]he work product privilege is aimed at protecting work done for litigation, not in 
preparing financial statements.”). 
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of litigation or for trial’ did not . . . mean prepared for some purpose 
other than litigation: it meant only that the work might be done for 
litigation but in advance of its institution.”113 To support its 
proposition, the court cited the advisory committee notes to Rule 
26(b)(3), which state that material created simply for normal or 
routine business purposes is not protected.114  
The Textron court seems to interpret the advisory committee notes 
to mean that any business purpose defeats the work product 
protection.115 Based on this interpretation, the court analyzes the 
work papers, finds an ordinary business purpose, and determines that 
work product protection is not available.116 However, this is not what 
the advisory committee notes say. Instead, they state that material is 
not protected if it is prepared for a business or public requirement 
purpose unrelated to litigation and imply that material having both a 
business and litigation purpose can be protected, and only material 
that is created regardless of potential litigation would be denied 
protection.117  
III.  PROPOSAL 
A.  The Court Should First Analyze its Prior Precedent 
The Eleventh Circuit has not formally adopted a test for analyzing 
material under the work product privilege.118 The District Court of 
Northern Alabama, in Regions Financial v. United States,119 
                                                                                                                 
 113. Id. at 29. 
 114. 1970 Amendments, supra note 43, at 501(“Materials assembled in the ordinary course of 
business, or pursuant to public requirements unrelated to litigation, or for other nonlitigation purposes 
are not under the qualified immunity . . . .”). 
 115. Textron, 577 F.3d at 30 (stating that “[e]ven if prepared by lawyers and reflecting legal 
thinking,” the work papers are not protected if created in the ordinary course of business). Further, the 
court dismissed the fact that the work papers had any relation to possible litigation with the IRS and 
simply stated that “[n]o one with experience of law suits would talk about tax accrual work papers in 
those terms.” Id.  
 116. See id. at 29–30.  
 117. 1970 Amendments, supra note 43, at 501. 
 118. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 119. Regions Fin. Corp. v. United States, No. 2:06-CV-00895-RDP, 2008 WL 2139008, at *3–5 
(N.D. Ala. May 8, 2008) (analyzing previous Eleventh and Fifth Circuit decisions and concluding that 
no binding test had been adopted). 
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performed a thorough analysis of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuit 
decisions and concluded that a binding test had not been adopted.120 
The Regions court did not apply one of the two existing tests—the 
because of or primary motivating purpose test—because it 
determined that under the facts of the case the material in question 
would be protected under either test.121 Since no cases addressing this 
issue have been presented in the Eleventh Circuit after Regions, the 
circuit court should analyze the existing tests and adopt the test that 
most closely aligns with both the plain language of Rule 26(b)(3) and 
the policy of the work product privilege.122 
B.  The Court Should Analyze the Plain Language and Policy of Rule 
26(b)(3) 
Rule 26(b)(3) states, “[A] party may not discover documents and 
tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for 
trial by or for another party.”123 The inclusion of the phrase in 
anticipation of litigation clearly indicates that material other than that 
created for trial is protected.124 However, the plain language of the 
Rule does not define the meaning of in anticipation of litigation.125 
For this, the court should look to the policy underlying the work 
product privilege for guidance.126  
The Supreme Court articulated the policy of work product 
protection in Hickman v. Taylor: “[I]t is essential that a lawyer work 
with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by 
                                                                                                                 
 120. Id.; supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text. 
 121. Supra note 64. 
 122. Supra note 65. 
 123. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). 
 124. United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1998) (“If the drafters of the Rule 
intended to limit its protection to documents made to assist in preparation for litigation, this would have 
been adequately conveyed by the phrase ‘prepared . . . for trial.’”). 
 125. Id. at 1197 (finding that in anticipation of litigation had not been defined and noting the various 
meanings given the phrase by other courts and commentators). 
 126. Several courts have looked to the policy and intent of the privilege to define in anticipation of 
litigation. See id. at 1197–1203 (analyzing the plain language, policy and advisory committee’s notes in 
determining that the because of litigation test is most closely aligned with the text and policy of the 
privilege). But see United States v. El Paso, 682 F.2d 530, 542 (5th Cir. 1982) (looking to the language 
and advisory committee’s notes but determining that the primary motivating purpose test is the more 
appropriate test). 
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opposing parties and their counsel. Proper preparation . . . demands 
that he . . . prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy without 
undue and needless interference.”127 The Court has reaffirmed this 
policy and stated, “At its core, the work-product doctrine shelters the 
mental processes of the attorney, providing a privileged area within 
which he can analyze and prepare his client’s case.”128  
As the Second Circuit noted in United States v. Adlman, the 
policies articulated by the Supreme Court and the intent of the 
drafters of the Rule suggest that a business purpose alone should not 
bar the protection of the material that reveals the opinions and legal 
theories concerning litigation.129 This interpretation would not deny 
protection of dual-purpose documents merely because they have a 
business purpose; rather, the focus would be on why the documents 
were created and whether they contain protected material.130 The 
Eleventh Circuit should keep these important policy considerations in 
mind when analyzing the appropriate test to adopt. 
C.  The Court Should Analyze the Tests Adopted by Other Courts 
In attempting to define in anticipation of litigation, circuit courts 
have adopted one of three main tests131—the majority of circuits have 
adopted the because of litigation test;132 the Fifth Circuit has adopted 
                                                                                                                 
 127. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510–11 (1947). 
 128. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 236–38 (1975). 
 129. Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1199 (“[T]he policies underlying the work-product doctrine suggest 
strongly that work-product protection should not be denied to a document that analyzes expected 
litigation merely because it is prepared to assist in a business decision.”). The intent of the Rule’s 
drafters is helpful in defining in anticipation of litigation. The advisory committee’s note states that 
“each side’s informal evaluation of its case should be protected, that each side should be encouraged to 
prepare independently, and that one side should not automatically have the benefit of the detailed 
preparatory work of the other side.” 1970 Amendments, supra note 43, at 501. 
 130. Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1200 (“We see no basis for adopting a test under which an attorney’s 
assessment of the likely outcome of litigation is freely available . . . merely because the document was 
created for a business purpose . . . . The fact that a document’s purpose is business-related appears 
irrelevant to the question whether it should be protected under Rule 26(b)(3).”). 
 131. See id. at 1195 (because of litigation test); United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 542 (5th 
Cir. 1982) (primary motivating purpose test); United States v. Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir. 
2009) (new for use in litigation test). For a discussion of each of the three tests, see discussion supra 
Part I.B. 
 132. For other courts adopting the because of test, see supra note 39. 
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the primary motivating purpose test;133 and the First Circuit has 
recently created the for use test.134 
1.  The Because of Litigation Test is Well Reasoned 
The because of litigation test is a well-reasoned test that considers 
both the actual language of the Rule and the underlying purpose of 
the work product privilege.135 The because of test protects material 
created because of anticipated litigation and allows protection of 
material whether or not it may have a business purpose.136 Material is 
denied protection only if it would have been prepared in substantially 
similar form regardless of the anticipated litigation.137 The primary 
goal of the because of test is protection of material that contains the 
mental impressions, conclusions, and opinions of the attorney, and it 
allows protection of material that may have a business purpose but 
nonetheless was created because of anticipated litigation.138  
The because of litigation test does not conflict with the plain 
language of Rule 26(b)(3), which protects documents prepared in 
anticipation of litigation, nor does it conflict with the underlying 
policy of the work product doctrine which is to protect the attorney’s 
assessment of the issue in light of potential litigation.139 For these 
reasons, the because of litigation test has been widely adopted and is 
the most prevalent test utilized by circuit courts to analyze material 
under the in anticipation of litigation requirement for work product 
protection.140  
                                                                                                                 
 133. El Paso, 682 F.2d at 542 (primary motivating purpose test). 
 134. Textron, 577 F.3d at 31 (new for use in litigation test). 
 135. See discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
 136. Id.   
 137. United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1195 (2d Cir. 1998).  
 138. Id. 
 139. See discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
 140. See discussion supra Part II.B.1; see also supra note 76. 
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2.  The Primary Motivating Purpose Test Denies Protection to 
Dual-Purpose Documents 
The primary motivating purpose test has been expressly adopted 
by only one circuit.141 This test protects material only when the 
primary purpose of the material is to assist in possible future 
litigation.142 Application of the primary motivating purpose test has 
resulted in the denial of protection because the primary purpose of 
the material was business related (i.e., to obtain a clean audit opinion 
of the financial statements), despite the fact that the work papers 
contained important mental impressions and legal opinions related to 
anticipated litigation.143  
The primary motivating purpose test places too much emphasis on 
the potential business purpose—at the expense of the protection of 
important legal opinions related to litigation that may be contained in 
the material.144 This emphasis is inconsistent with the primary goal of 
work product protection—to protect the attorney’s mental 
impressions and opinions regarding anticipated litigation.145 The 
Supreme Court, since Hickman v. Taylor, has stressed the policy goal 
of the privilege as the protection of the mental impressions and 
opinions of the attorney.146  
Additionally, the primary motivating purpose test places too much 
emphasis on a comment of the drafters that ordinary business 
documents are not protected.147 The advisory committee notes state 
that ordinary business documents are not protected, but this comment 
must be read in conjunction with the actual language of the Rule.148 
                                                                                                                 
 141. United States v. El Paso, 682 F.2d 530, 542 (5th Cir. 1982); see also Henkel, supra note 7, at 
n.22. 
 142. El Paso, 682 F.2d at 542. 
 143. See id. at 543–44. 
 144. The El Paso court determined that because the work papers at issue were created primarily to 
substantiate the company’s tax reserve on its financial statements, the material was not protected. Id. at 
543. 
 145. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510–11 (1947). 
 146. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 236–38 (1975). 
 147. 1970 Amendments, supra note 43, at 501 (“Materials assembled in the ordinary course of 
business, or pursuant to public requirements unrelated to litigation, or for other nonlitigation purposes 
are not under the qualified immunity . . . .”). 
 148. The text of the Rule states that material other than only that prepared for trial are protected. FED. 
R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). Specifically, material prepared in anticipation of litigation is also protected. Id. The 
 
24
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 7
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol27/iss3/7
2011] WORK PRODUCT PRIVILEGE  
 
753
When read together, the advisory committee notes imply protection 
of dual-purpose documents and only emphasize that ordinary 
business documents, which would be created even if litigation was 
not anticipated, would be denied protection.149 The committee notes 
stress the importance of protecting the opinions and impressions of 
the attorneys preparing for anticipated litigation.150 Unlike the 
primary motivating purpose test, the because of litigation test 
addresses these concerns by requiring the court to ask whether the 
material would have been prepared even if there had been no 
anticipation of litigation—allowing protection of dual-purpose 
documents but denying protection to ordinary business records that 
would have been prepared whether there was anticipated litigation or 
not.151  
3.  The For Use Test Denies Protection to Documents Not Created 
for Trial 
The for use test, recently created by the First Circuit in Textron v. 
United States, protects material only if prepared for use in 
litigation.152 This court’s view is that the work product privilege is 
aimed at protecting work done for litigation and not for preparing 
financial statements.153 The court states: “‘[P]repared in anticipation 
of litigation or for trial’ did not . . . mean prepared for some purpose 
other than litigation: it meant only that the work might be done for 
litigation but in advance of its institution.”154 Application of the for 
use test has resulted in the denial of protection to dual-purpose 
                                                                                                                 
advisory committee’s notes state, “Materials assembled in the ordinary course of business, or pursuant to 
public requirements unrelated to litigation, or for other nonlitigation purposes are not under the qualified 
immunity . . . .” The advisory committee notes imply that ordinary business records prepared where 
there is no anticipation of litigation are not in anticipation of litigation, but the notes do not imply that 
material created with anticipated litigation in mind that have a business purpose would not be 
protected—that would directly contradict the plain language of the in anticipation of litigation clause in 
the Rule. 1970 Amendments, supra note 43, at 501. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
 151. United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1195 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 152. United States v. Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 153. Id. (holding that work product privilege does not protect material created in preparation of 
financial statements). 
 154. Id. at 29. 
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documents because the material was prepared for a business purpose, 
despite the fact that the material contained important mental 
impressions and legal opinions related to anticipated litigation.155  
Much like the primary motivating purpose test, the for use test also 
places too much emphasis on the potential business purpose—and the 
advisory committee notes—at the expense of the protection of 
important legal opinions related to litigation.156 The for use test is 
inconsistent with the plain language of the Rule and the primary goal 
of work product protection.157 The for use test goes one step further 
than the primary motivating purpose test, and it rewrites the Rule to 
require preparation for use in anticipated litigation or for use at 
trial.158 Rule 26(b)(3) states that material prepared in anticipation of 
litigation—not “for use in anticipation of litigation”—is protected.159 
Additionally, the First Circuit’s reliance on the advisory committee 
notes is misplaced.160  
In contrast, the because of test addresses these concerns by 
requiring the court to ask whether the material would have been 
prepared even if there had been no anticipation of litigation—
allowing protection of dual-purpose documents but denying 
protection to ordinary business records that would have been 
prepared whether or not litigation was anticipated.161  
D.  The Eleventh Circuit Should Formally Adopt the Because of 
Litigation Test 
The primary motivating purpose test is too narrow because it 
denies protection to most dual-purpose documents at the expense of 
the protection of important legal opinion related to anticipated 
                                                                                                                 
 155. Id. at 29–30. 
 156. See supra note 144.  
 157. See supra note 148. 
 158. See supra note 148. As noted by the court in United States v. Adlman, “Nowhere does Rule 
26(b)(3) state that a document must have been prepared to aid in the conduct of litigation in order to 
constitute work product.” United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 159. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). 
 160. See supra note 148. 
 161. Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1195.  
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litigation—a key principle of the work product doctrine.162 The for 
use in anticipated litigation test is too narrow because it denies 
protection to documents not created to be used in anticipated 
litigation, which is at odds with the actual language of Rule 
26(b)(3).163 The Eleventh Circuit should join the majority of courts 
that have addressed the issue of dual-purposed documents and adopt 
the because of litigation test. This test considers both the actual 
language of the Rule and the underlying purpose of the work product 
privilege, eliminating the concerns and issues raised by the primary 
motivating purpose and the for use tests.164  
CONCLUSION 
The struggle between the IRS and business taxpayers regarding the 
discovery of tax accrual work papers will continue until the Supreme 
Court addresses the issue and imposes a test.165 Until then, the IRS 
will continue to seek a road map of the corporation’s vulnerable tax 
positions, and corporate taxpayers will continue to fight, desperate to 
keep the IRS from discovering the legal analysis of their weak 
spots.166 In balancing these competing interests, the Eleventh Circuit 
should seek to adopt a test that is consistent with the plain language 
of the Rule and the spirit of the work product privilege outlined by 
the Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor.167 The because of litigation 
test accomplishes both of these goals—allowing the IRS access to 
work papers created where the taxpayer has no reasonable basis for 
anticipating litigation and protecting the attorney’s legal opinions in 
                                                                                                                 
 162. See discussion supra Part III.C.2. 
 163. See discussion supra Part III.C.3. 
 164. See discussion supra Part III.C.1. 
 165. See United States v. Arthur Young, 465 U.S. 805, 807 (1984) (IRS challenge of judgment 
holding tax work papers privileged); United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1982) 
(appeal of enforcement of IRS summons seeking taxpayer’s tax accrual work papers); Adlman, 134 F.3d 
at 1194; I.R.S. Announcement 2002-63 (July 8, 2002) (IRS expands internal policy on seeking tax 
accrual work papers). 
 166. See Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 807 (IRS challenge of judgment holding tax work papers 
privileged); El Paso, 682 F.2d at 532 (appeal of enforcement of IRS summons seeking taxpayer’s tax 
accrual work papers); Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1194; I.R.S. Announcement 2002-63 (IRS expands internal 
policy on seeking tax accrual work papers).  
 167. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
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cases where litigation is reasonably anticipated. Adopting the because 
of test eliminates the need to determine whether a business purpose 
for the material exists, because anticipation of litigation—not the 
absence of a business purpose—is the real key to protection of 
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